STATE OF MICHIGAN

Attorney Discipline Board

GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR,
Attorney Grievance Commission,

Petitioner,

v Case No. 09-43-GA

RAYMOND A. MACDONALD, P 16918,

Respondent.
_____/

ORDER AFFIRMING HEARING PANEL ORDER OF SUSPENSION WITH CONDITIONS

Issued by the Attorney Discipline Board
211 W. Fort St., Ste. 1410, Detroit, MI

Tri-County Hearing Panel #22 of the Attorney Discipline Board entered an order of suspension with conditions in this matter on June 21, 2010.[1] The panel's order directed the suspension of respondent's license to practice law in Michigan for a period of two years commencing July 13, 2010,[2] with the conditions that prior to filing a petition for reinstatement in accordance with MCR 9.123(B) and MCR 9.124, respondent shall take and pass the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination and shall attend 15 hours of continuing legal education in pre-trial procedure. Respondent petitioned for review of the panel's order on July 12, 2010.

The Attorney Discipline Board has conducted review proceedings in accordance with MCR 9.118, including the Board's review of the record before the hearing panel and its consideration of the briefs and arguments submitted by the parties at a hearing conducted before the Board on November 10, 2010.

NOW THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing panel order of suspension with conditions entered June 21, 2010 is **AFFIRMED**.

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[1]The hearing panel's order, dated June 21, 2010, is attached to this order as Appendix A; the panel's report on misconduct, dated April 7, 2010, is attached as Appendix B; the panel's discipline report, dated June 21, 2010, is attached as Appendix C.

[2]The effective date of the suspension of respondent's license was changed from July 13, 2010, to August 3, 2010, in an order of the Attorney Discipline Board entered July 16, 2010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall, on or before January 8, 2011, pay costs in the amount of **$3,174.45**, consisting of costs assessed by the hearing panel in the amount of $3,105.20 and court reporting costs incurred by the Attorney Discipline Board in the amount of $69.25 for the review proceedings conducted on November 10, 2010. Check or money order shall be made payable to the State Bar of Michigan, but submitted to the Attorney Discipline Board [211 West Fort St., Ste. 1410, Detroit, MI 48226] for proper crediting. (See attached instruction sheet).

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE BOARD

By: _____
Thomas G. Kienbaum, Chairperson

DATED: December 10, 2010

Board members, Thomas G. Kienbaum, William L. Matthews, C.P.A., Andrea L. Solak, Rosalind E. Griffin, M.D., Carl E. Ver Beek, Craig H. Lubben, James M. Cameron, Jr., and Sylvia P. Whitmer, Ph.D, concur in this decision.

Board member William J. Danhof was recused and did not participate.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

Attorney Discipline Board

GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR,
Attorney Grievance Commission,

Petitioner,

v Case No. 09-43-GA

RAYMOND A. MACDONALD, P 16918,

Respondent.
_____/

ORDER OF SUSPENSION WITH CONDITIONS

Issued by the Attorney Discipline Board
Tri-County Hearing Panel #22

Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson
Laurence C. Burgess, Member
C. David Miller, II, Member

This matter is before the panel upon the filing of Formal Complaint 09-43-GA charging that respondent, Raymond A. Macdonald, has committed acts of professional misconduct warranting discipline. The panel has filed its reports on misconduct and discipline, which include application of the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, its findings and conclusions as to misconduct and discipline, and being otherwise fully advised;

NOW THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Raymond A. Macdonald, is **SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN MICHIGAN FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS COMMENCING** July 13, 2010, and until further order of the Supreme Court, the Attorney Discipline Board or a hearing panel, and until respondent complies with the requirements of MCR 9.123(B) and MCR 9.124.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for purposes of MCR 9.119, the effective date of this order is July 13, 2010.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent, prior to filing a petition for reinstatement in accordance with MCR 9.123(B) and MCR 9.124, shall comply with the following conditions:

A. Respondent shall take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). Respondent shall provide written proof of his successful completion of this exam to the Attorney Grievance Commission and the Attorney Discipline Board within 14 days of passing the exam.

APPENDIX A

B. Respondent shall attend 15 hours of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) in pre-trial procedure. Half of the CLE hours shall be in civil pre-trial procedure and the other half of the CLE hours shall be in criminal pre-trial procedure. Respondent shall provide written proof of successful completion of these courses to the Attorney Grievance Commission and the Attorney Discipline Board within 14 days of attending each course.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that from the effective date of this order and until reinstatement in accordance with the applicable provisions of MCR 9.123, respondent is forbidden from practicing law in any form; appearing as an attorney before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority; or holding himself out as an attorney by any means.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall, in accordance with MCR 9.119(A), within seven days after the effective date of this order, notify all of his active clients, in writing, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, of the following:

1. the nature and duration of the discipline imposed;

2. the effective date of such discipline;

3. respondent's inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of such discipline;

4. the location and identity of the custodian of the clients' files and records which will be made available to them or to substitute counsel;

5. that the clients may wish to seek legal advice and counsel elsewhere; provided that if respondent is a member of a law firm, the firm may continue to represent each client with the client's express written consent;

6. the address to which all correspondence to respondent may be addressed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in accordance with MCR 9.119(B), respondent must, on or before the effective date of this order, in every matter in which respondent is representing a client in litigation, file with the tribunal and all parties a notice of respondent's disqualification from the practice of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall, within 14 days after the effective date of this order, file with the Grievance Administrator and the Attorney Discipline Board an affidavit of compliance as required by MCR 9.119(C).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent's conduct after the entry of this order but prior to its effective date, shall be subject to the restrictions set forth in MCR 9.119(D); and respondent's compensation for legal services shall be subject to the restrictions described in MCR 9.119(F).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall, on or before July 13, 2010, pay costs in the amount of **<u>$3,105.20</u>**. Check or money order shall be made payable to the State Bar of Michigan, but submitted to the Attorney Discipline Board [211 West Fort St., Ste. 1410, Detroit, MI 48226] for proper crediting. (See attached instruction sheet).

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE BOARD
Tri-County Hearing Panel #22

By: [signature]
Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson

DATED: June 21, 2010

STATE OF MICHIGAN

Attorney Discipline Board

GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR,
Attorney Grievance Commission,

Petitioner,

v Case No. 09-43-GA

RAYMOND A. MACDONALD, P 16918,

Respondent.
_____/

REPORT ON MISCONDUCT OF TRI-COUNTY HEARING PANEL #22

PRESENT: Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson
Laurence C. Burgess, Member
C. David Miller, II, Member

APPEARANCES: Patrick K. McGlinn, Senior Associate Counsel,
for the Attorney Grievance Commission

Raymond A. Macdonald, Respondent,
in pro per

I. EXHIBITS

Please see Index to Exhibits, page 90, Volume II, of the February 23, 2010 hearing transcript.

II. WITNESSES

Patricia Reed, Complainant - October 19, 2009 hearing
James P. Majkowski - February 23, 2010 hearing

III. PANEL PROCEEDINGS

On May 6, 2009, the Grievance Administrator filed Formal Complaint 09-43-GA alleging that respondent, Raymond A. Macdonald, had committed professional misconduct in a drunk driving matter by frivolously asserting or controverting an issue with the proceeding; failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; and knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal. The complaint further alleged that respondent, in a civil matter, frivolously asserted or controverted an issue with the proceeding; failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client;

knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. Respondent was also alleged to have engaged in conduct that is a violation of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct; that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, where such conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; exposed the legal profession or the courts to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach; and is contrary to justice ethics, honesty, or good morals. The matter was assigned to Tri-County Hearing Panel #22 for hearing.

On June 17, 2009, contemporaneously with his answer to the formal complaint, respondent also filed two motions. One motion sought to disqualify Panel Member C. David Miller; and the second motion sought to dismiss unsigned or unauthenticated complaint.

Pursuant to MCR 9.115(F)(4)(d), the panel scheduled a pre-trial hearing for June 30, 2009, which was held at the offices of the Attorney Discipline Board, 211 West Fort Street, Suite 1410, Detroit, Michigan. Present were the members of Tri-County Hearing Panel #22: Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson; C. David Miller, II, Member; and Laurence C. Burgess, Member. Patrick K. McGlinn appeared on behalf of the Grievance Administrator. Respondent did not appear and Chairperson Talarico noted that respondent had indicated to the panel that he objected to the pre-trial hearing and would not attend.

The panel first addressed respondent's motion to disqualify Panel Member Miller. Pursuant to the court rule, a panel member is required to notify the parties if the member identifies a conflict or a problem in their serving on the panel. The parties then have 14 days to move to disqualify the member and the Chairperson of the Attorney Discipline Board would then render a decision on the motion. In this instance, Member Miller stated that he was unaware that one of the members of his law firm is currently defending a client in litigation against respondent. However, Member Miller stated that he is not aware of any of the proceedings between respondent and his colleague.

Chairperson Talarico dismissed respondent's motion to disqualify Member Miller, but noted that it can be brought again if there are grounds.

Patrick McGlinn, counsel for the Grievance Administrator, then addressed the second motion filed by respondent which requested that the formal complaint be dismissed because it was improperly signed by the Deputy Grievance Administrator, Robert E. Edick, instead of the Grievance Administrator Robert L. Agacinski. After some discussion, Mr. McGlinn stated that he would file an amended complaint containing Mr. Agacinski's signature.

The panel then determined the dates for a scheduling order, which was issued on July 15, 2009, setting for the date for the filing of the witness and exhibit lists on or before August 17, 2009, with any objections to be filed on or before September 17, 2009. September 17, 2009 will also be the cutoff date for any motions and any replies shall be filed on or before October 1, 2009. A hearing on the formal complaint was scheduled for October 19, 2009.

On August 4, 2009, respondent filed a motion to strike the pre-trial scheduling order, to disqualify Hearing Panel #22, and to dismiss the complaint.

The Grievance Administrator filed a motion to amend the formal complaint which requested authority to remove two allegations and to make some minor clerical edits.

The panel denied respondent's motion to dismiss the formal complaint on September 3, 2009. On September 18, 2009, the panel issued its order denying respondent's motion to strike pre-trial scheduling order and granting the Administrator's motion to amend the formal complaint. On October 14, 2009, the Attorney Discipline Board issued two orders denying respondent's motion to disqualify hearing panelist C. David Miller, II, and his motion to disqualify Tri-County Hearing Panel #22.

The Grievance Administrator filed the amended formal complaint on October 16, 2009, and the parties convened for the hearing on the complaint on October 19, 2009, at the offices of the Attorney Discipline Board. Present at that hearing were the members of Tri-County Hearing Panel #22: Paula A. Talarico, Chairperson; Laurence C. Burgess, Member; and C. David Miller, II, Member. Patrick K. McGlinn appeared on behalf of the Grievance Administrator and respondent, Raymond A. Macdonald, appeared in pro per.

At the outset of the hearing, the panel heard oral arguments on two motions which were pending before the panel. The first motion, filed by counsel for the Grievance Administrator, was a motion in limine requesting that the panel allow two judicial decrees to be admitted as evidence, pursuant to MCL 600.2106 and the Board's holding in *Grievance Administrator v Fieger*, ADB Case No. 97-83-GA (1999). After oral arguments from both parties, the panel granted the motion. The second motion, filed by the respondent, was a motion for more definite statement or to strike allegations of formal complaint. The panel heard the arguments of both parties before denying the motion.

The panel next addressed the objections filed by the Grievance Administrator's counsel to respondent's witness and exhibit list. Specifically, that respondent listed employees of the Attorney Grievance Commission, the Attorney Discipline Board, and the Supreme Court Administrative Office, as witnesses. Counsel for the Grievance Administrator pointed out that none of the employees were a party to any of the allegations in the formal complaint and should be stricken. As for the remaining witnesses, the Grievance Administrator's objections were based on the fact that respondent did not provide any summary of why the witnesses were being called. The panel noted that, in its pre-trial scheduling order, it had directed the parties to file their respective witness and exhibit lists and had ordered that the "witness lists shall contain a short synopses of anticipated testimony." The panel directed respondent to review the Grievance Administrator's objections and file a reply by November 19, 2009, which states how respondent's witnesses and exhibits are relevant to his defense. The panel further ruled that respondent was not allowed to list any employees of the Supreme Court, the Attorney Grievance Commission, or the Attorney Discipline Board as witnesses.

Following the rulings on these motions, the panel heard testimony from Patricia Reed, witness for the Grievance Administrator, since she was present and ready to testify.

After being sworn in, Ms. Reed testified that she was a party in a lawsuit where respondent was the opposing counsel. She stated that she had attended hearings at the Wayne County Circuit Court, but she did not attend any of the hearings held before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. She further testified that her attorney, Tom Silvia, kept her apprised of all relevant orders and events regarding her matter and she was aware that the Wayne County Circuit Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court had all issued separate orders against respondent for costs and sanctions against respondent, but, as far she knows, respondent has not paid any of the judgments or orders for sanctions.

Upon cross-examination, Ms. Reed testified that she prepared the request for investigation which was submitted to the Attorney Grievance Commission on behalf of the Scarab Club Board of Directors ("Scarab"). She stated that respondent was the plaintiff in the lawsuit and that attorney Tom Silvia was retained to defend Scarab. She further testified that respondent sued the wrong entity when he filed his lawsuit. Initially, he had named the individual board members of Scarab instead of the board as a collective. The litigation went forward against the Scarab Club Board of Directors instead of the individual board members.

At this point, Chairperson Talarico advised respondent that if he wanted Ms. Reed to continue to testify, he would have to make a very specific offer of proof about what he expects her to testify to. The panel then called for a brief recess and, back on the record, Chairperson Talarico excused the witness and announced that the hearing would continue at a time and date to be noticed by the Attorney Discipline Board. Chairperson Talarico also advised respondent to be better prepared at the next hearing as the panel would not tolerate further wasting of time by respondent due to his lack of preparation and organization.

Respondent filed his witness list and exhibit list on November 25, 2009, and a hearing was scheduled for January 26, 2010. On December 3, 2009, respondent filed a petition for interlocutory review to set aside the motion in limine granted by the panel. On December 28, 2009, respondent filed a second petition for interlocutory review seeking that the disciplinary proceedings be declared null and void, or in the alternative, that Patricia Reed be required to appear and testify. The Board denied both of respondent's petitions in its order issued January 12, 2010.

On January 22, 2010, respondent filed "Motion for Rehearing of Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Hearing Panelist C. David Miller & Tricounty Hearing Panel #22 Motion to Disqualify Chairperson Paula A. Talarico."

On January 26, 2010, Member Burgess appeared on behalf of Tri-County Hearing Panel #22 and noted that the panel had been notified that respondent was unable to appear that day due to an automobile accident. Member Burgess stated that the panel would require respondent to provide the panel with a copy of the police report of the accident to verify his inability to appear. Counsel for the Grievance Administrator requested that the panel suspend respondent's license in the interim, pursuant to MCR 9.115(H), due to his physical incapacity to appear before the panel. That request was denied and the hearing was adjourned.

A notice of hearing was issued on January 27, 2010, scheduling a continuation of the hearing for February 23, 2010. On February 22, 2010, respondent filed a motion for summary disposition.

The February 23, 2010 hearing, took place at the offices of the Attorney Discipline Board, 211 W. Fort Street, Suite 1410, Detroit, Michigan. Present were the members of Tri-County Hearing Panel #22: Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson; Laurence C. Burgess, Member; and C. David Miller, II, Member. Also present were Patrick K. McGlinn, counsel for the Grievance Administrator, and Raymond A. Macdonald, respondent.

At the outset of the hearing, respondent stated that attorney James P. Majkowski was appearing as his co-counsel and would also be called as a witness on respondent's behalf. Counsel for the Grievance Administrator requested that Mr. Majkowski be sequestered if he was going to be testifying. However, after questioning by the panel, it was determined that Mr.

Majkowski would not be acting as co-counsel and would not be performing any examinations or cross-examinations.

The panel then addressed respondent's motion for summary disposition, filed February 22, 2010. Chairperson Talarico noted that the panel had set September 17, 2009, as the cutoff date for the filing of motions. The panel declined to issue a decision on the motion because it had not been timely filed.

Counsel for the Grievance Administrator then offered Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 12 for admission. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, a certified copy of the full court records in *State of Michigan v Boguszewski*, Case No. 04-1629P, was offered in support of the allegations in Count One of the complaint. Respondent objected to the submission of Petitioner's Exhibit 1, but when questioned by Member Burgess, he admitted that he had not filed a written objection to the exhibit, as required by the panel's pre-trial scheduling order.

Petitioner's Exhibits 2 through 12 were offered in support of the allegations in Count Two of the complaint. As each subsequent exhibit was offered, Chairperson Talarico asked if respondent had filed a written objection to the specific exhibit. In each instance, respondent's reply was, "No," and Petitioner's Exhibits 2 through 12 were admitted. Counsel for the Grievance Administrator then stated that the exhibits were all the evidence he had in support of the allegations in the amended formal complaint and rested his case.

After a brief recess, respondent was directed to call his witness, but he stated that he was confused by petitioner's exhibits. Member Miller stated:

Mr. Miller:	Mr. McGlinn said for each exhibit, that it went to either Count 1 or it went to Count 2.
Mr. Macdonald:	Okay.
Mr. Miller:	Therefore, we as a trier of fact get to review these documents to see whether they support Count 1 or Count 2. That is his burden of proof. If we read through the documents and we don't think that they support it, then that's a benefit to you because maybe Mr. McGlinn didn't point us to a particular point. But that's a benefit to you that he didn't do that.
Mr. Macdonald:	Uh-huh.

[Tr. 02/23/2010, p 131.]

Respondent then called his witness, James P. Majkowski, to testify. After being sworn in, Mr. Majkowski stated that he went to the Wayne County Circuit Court as respondent's counsel on or about February 7, 2007, to address a show cause order for contempt that respondent had received from Judge Mary Beth Kelley. Mr. Majkowski testified that he registered an objection at the show cause hearing as to the service of the order because he believed that the service was defective. He believed it should have been personally served, unless it was otherwise ordered by the court. He also stated that he had no indication that the court had ordered different service. When questioned by Member Burgess, however, Mr. Majkowski stated that he had no personal knowledge of how the show cause order had been served upon respondent. Mr. Majkowski also stated that the order to show cause did not recite a basis for what conduct constituted contempt.

Mr. Majkowski testified that Judge Kelley referred the matter to Judge Giovan for the purposes of avoiding impropriety and Mr. Majkowski, along with the three other counsel appearing for the various parties, went to Judge Giovan's courtroom. Mr. Majkowski stated that Judge Giovan made an announcement from the bench, which was followed by a written order, which stated that "the contempt proceeding that had been scheduled would not go forward until – unless and until a more specific instrument was drawn up giving notice of just what conduct was alleged to be contemnatious." (Tr. 02/23/10, p 146.)

When questioned by Chairperson Talarico, Mr. Majkowski stated that he only represented respondent in the Scarab matter one time - regarding the show cause order for contempt - and that he did not represent respondent in the Ronald Boguszewski matter. Upon further questioning by the panel, Mr. Majkowski testified that the scope of his representation of respondent commenced on February 7, 2007, regarding the show cause order for contempt, and while he never formally withdrew his representation and continued to receive mailings from the court, his appearance on the show cause order was the extent of his representation.

Respondent then tried to question Mr. Majkowski about a document that was not in evidence, specifically focusing on names that were handwritten onto the caption. The panel questioned the relevance of having Mr. Majkowski testify about this matter and Chairperson Talarico advised respondent that he needed to begin to address the specific charges alleged in the amended formal complaint instead of spending time on issues not relevant to the alleged misconduct.

Respondent did not have any further questions for Mr. Majkowski and counsel for the Grievance Administrator declined cross-examination. The witness was excused and respondent stated that he had no other witness there today.

The panel took a brief recess and, back on the record, Member Burgess advised respondent that, assuming that the exhibits which were admitted were relevant to the alleged misconduct, respondent should begin to address those issues substantively while he has the opportunity. Chairperson Talarico asked if respondent was going to testify on his own behalf and respondent stated that he had not considered it. Chairperson Talarico advised respondent that, at this time, he could either testify on his own behalf, call another witness, or make his closing argument. The panel denied respondent's suggestion that the parties submit written briefs in lieu of continuing the hearing.

After a brief lunch recess, Member Miller asked respondent if he had any evidence to present to rebut the exhibits presented by the Grievance Administrator's counsel with respect to the allegations contained in Count Two. Respondent stated that it was the Grievance Administrator's counsel's responsibility to provide a complete picture of the case. Member Miller advised respondent that it was his responsibility to prove his portion of the case, but if he wanted to say it was the Grievance Administrator's counsel's responsibility, ". . . then fine, that's your response. But I want to make sure that you know that you can put in more." (Tr. 02/23/10, pp 170-171.) Respondent stated that he could provide documentation to rebut the Grievance Administrator's evidence, but he would need time to assemble those documents and would send them to the panel. The panel advised respondent that he had had ample time to assemble any documents he would need to rebut the exhibits offered by the Grievance Administrator and that today was the day he needed to provide those documents.

Respondent proceeded to offer documents which had already been admitted into evidence as part of petitioner's exhibits. However, when he tried to submit a group of letters, one of which was from Corbin Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, the panel asked how the letters were relevant. Respondent stated that Count Two alleges that he did not pay sanctions and the letters showed that he had asked the Supreme Court who he needed to pay, but that he never received an answer. At this point, the following exchange took place:

Chairperson Talarico:	You're going to have to be sworn and testify as to what happened here.
Mr. Macdonald:	Why?
Chairperson Talarico:	Because these aren't in evidence.
Mr. Macdonald:	Well, I'm offering them into evidence.
Chairperson Talarico:	Right, but you never - - you did not comply with the orders, the prior orders. You - - if you had these, they should have been given to Mr. McGlinn last summer and give him a chance to look at them, and then, if he had objections, he could bring objections.
Mr. Macdonald:	He was told about them.
Chairperson Talarico:	Sir, you know what our order was. You know what an order of the court is.
Mr. Macdonald:	Yes, and I followed it.
Chairperson Talarico:	This is not in compliance with the order.
Mr. Macdonald:	Well, I think it is.
Chairperson Talarico:	Okay. Do you want to be sworn in and testify as to your defense with regard to those two paragraphs in Count 2?
Mr. Macdonald:	No, I want that admitted into evidence.
Chairperson Talarico:	Okay, denied.

[Tr. 02/23/10, pp 183-184.]

Respondent then stated that he had wanted to question Patricia Reed further with respect to the request for investigation she filed with the Attorney Grievance Commission, but stated that the panel had cut him off and said she wasn't coming back. Chairperson Talarico stated:

> Chairperson Talarico: I've got the transcript and what I said and what this panel said was that subject to an offer of proof, which you could have made any time up until yesterday, about Ms. Reed's - - about the necessity of bringing Ms. Reed back, that we were not going to make her come back unless you gave us an offer of proof. So that's, that's a nonstarter as an argument.
>
> [Tr. 02/23/10, p 189.]

Counsel for the Grievance Administrator presented his closing argument. With respect to Count One, the Grievance Administrator's counsel noted:

> Mc. McGlinn: That through his conduct in not appearing, through his motion to judge - - to disqualify Judge Redmond, which we assert was frivolous, by attaching an unfiled civil complaint and then by going before Judge Maceroni on a motion to strike Judge Redmond's order, he - - in which he did not advise that it was a, only a potential

civil claim but it was then and there civil complaint, his own words, that - - a pending civil complaint, that that was perpetrating fraud upon the court.

[Tr. 02/23/10, pp 197-198.]

With respect to Count Two, counsel for the Grievance Administrator stated that the exhibits provided showed that respondent filed frivolous pleadings and disobeyed obligations of a tribunal or court orders. Furthermore, respondent's behavior interfered with the administration of justice.

Respondent, in his closing argument, stated that there were only two allegations of misconduct against him in Count One - that he did not appear at a hearing and that he filed a frivolous motion alleging a pending matter. As for the non-appearance, respondent stated that the hearing was held in the wrong court. The hearing should have been held in District Court 41-A, where the judge was assigned, and not District Court 38, which is where the hearing was held. As for the pending matter, he admitted that he attached a copy of the complaint he proposed to file against Judge Redmond, but that complaint could be construed as "pending" even though it had not yet been filed.

With respect to the allegations in Count Two, respondent again focused on the fact that additional parties were added to the underlying action which were never added by an order of the court. The panel reminded respondent that he had not provided any documents which showed that there wasn't such an order. Respondent reiterated his position that the Grievance Administrator's counsel should have provided that information, but Member Burgess stated:

Member Burgess: But you need to address it, you need to respond to it. That's - - you have an opportunity to bring it in and say, Hey, look it, there was no order here, there's either scheduled actions in that court or some other way of proving it to us so that we know that it was never done.

[Tr. 02/23/10, p 205.]

Chairperson Talarico then informed the parties that the panel would take the matter under advisement and issue its findings.

IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING MISCONDUCT

Count One

With respect to the allegations that respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal (MRPC 3.3(a)(1)); and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation (MRPC 8.4(b)), the panel finds that these allegations were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Discussion

The allegations that respondent frivolously asserted or controverted an issue within the proceeding, in violation of MRPC 3.1; and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, in violation of MRPC 8.4(b), are based on paragraphs 19, 26, and 27 of the amended formal complaint, which read:

19. On or about August 17, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to disqualify Judge Redmond alleging that Judge Redmond was personally biased and prejudiced against Respondent due to an adverse economic interest - namely an incomplete, unfiled, and undisclosed (to Judge Redmond) lawsuit Respondent had drafted alleging that Judge Redmond, while in private practice, had taken improper action against Respondent as opposing counsel.

* * *

26. On or about September 22, 2005, Respondent field a "Motion to Strike Notice of Hearing, Motion to Strike Opinion & Order of Judge Norene S. Redmond, Motion to Refer Case to Michigan Court Administrator For Reassignment For Hearing De Novo of Motion to Disqualify [Judge] Michael S. Maceroni".

27. In said pleading, in support of his claim the Judge Redmond should not have heard the mater [sic], Respondent falsely asserted that there was, at the time of Judge Redmond's assignment, "then and there pending a civil claim against" Judge Redmond.

Further, the allegation that respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal, in violation of MRPC 3.3(a)(1), is based only on the allegations contained in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the amended formal complaint.

The panel conducted an independent review of record before it which shows that respondent, in his August 17, 2005 motion, stated:

> That plaintiff moves to disqualify the said Judge Redmond . . . because of adverse "economic interest," as here and after set forth and further amplified in the attached **draft of a lawsuit to be filed by defendant's attorney against the said Judge Norene Redmond** while acting as attorney at law.
> [Emphasis added.]

In Count One, paragraph 5 of respondent's September 22, 2005 motion, he stated:

> That upon receiving said notice defense counsel filed his motion to disqualify the said Judge Norene Redmond, on the basis that there was then and there pending a civil claim against the said Norene Redmond.

In his closing argument, as noted above, the Grievance Administrator's counsel stated this was "perpetrating a fraud upon the court."" [Tr. 02/23/10, p198.]

It is clear to this panel that, with respect to respondent's September 22, 2005 motion, when respondent referenced that "there was then and there pending a civil claim . . . , " he was referring to his August 17, 2005 motion which stated that the pleading was a draft "to be filed."

Further, it is clear that Judge Redmond herself knew that the complaint respondent had attached to his motion to disqualify her had not been filed with the court. In her August 31, 2005 order and opinion regarding respondent's motion to disqualify her, she stated:

> Defense counsel argues that this Judge, acting in an appellate capacity, must be disqualified because **he allegedly plans to sue her in Macomb County Circuit Court** based on events that allegedly occurred approximately three years ago. [Opinion and Order, 08/31/05, p 2.] [Emphasis added.]

A review of the record on the whole clearly shows that respondent's statement -- "that there was then and there pending a civil claim" -- does not rise to a knowingly made false statement of material fact to a tribunal, nor is it conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. Accordingly, we find no violation of MRPC 3.1 (as alleged in paragraph 27 only); 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(b).

With respect to the allegation that respondent's conduct as outlined in paragraphs 19 and 26 violated MRPC 3.1, the panel finds that respondent's actions did violate MRPC 3.1. As demonstrated in the record, respondent filed motions to disqualify Judges Redmond and Maceroni with no evidence of bias or prejudice. This panel finds that respondent used those frivolous filings to delay proceedings in the district court in contravention of MRPC 3.1.

However, of greater concern to the panel is that, when given numerous opportunities on the record, respondent did not make any attempt to bring this information to the panel's attention, nor did he present any evidence to rebut the Grievance Administrator's allegations.

Count Two

The panel finds, based on the exhibits provided by the Grievance Administrator, and the testimony of Patricia Reed, that respondent, as counsel of record for the plaintiffs in the complaint captioned *Raymond A. MacDonald and Scarab Club v Patricia Reed, et al*, Case No. 04-405012-CZ, in the Wayne County Circuit Court, frivolously asserted or controverted an issue with the proceeding, in violation of MRPC 3.1, and knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists, in violation of MRPC 3.4(c).

Finally, the panel finds that respondent engaged in conduct that is a violation of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct; engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; engaged in conduct that exposes the legal profession or the courts to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach; and engaged in conduct that is contrary to justice, ethics, honesty, or good morals, in violation of MCR 9.104(A)(1)-(4); and Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) and (c).

Pursuant to these findings, a hearing for the sanction phase of this matter has been scheduled for April 26, 2010.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE BOARD
Tri-County Hearing Panel #22

DATED: April 7, 2010

By: Paula M Talarico
Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson

STATE OF MICHIGAN

Attorney Discipline Board

GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATOR,
Attorney Grievance Commission,

Petitioner,

v

Case No. 09-43-GA

RAYMOND A. MACDONALD, P 16918,

Respondent.
_____/

DISCIPLINE REPORT OF TRI-COUNTY HEARING PANEL #22

PRESENT: Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson
Laurence C. Burgess, Member
C. David Miller, II, Member

APPEARANCES: Patrick K. McGlinn, Senior Associate Counsel,
for the Attorney Grievance Commission

Raymond A. Macdonald, Respondent,
in pro per

I. EXHIBITS

Petitioner's	Description
A	Letter of Admonishment, dated 07/29/88.
B	Amended Notice of Reprimand, effective 12/30/97.
C	Notice of Reprimand and Restitution (By Consent), effective April 8, 2003.

Respondent's	Description
1	Letter from Carol Reid, dated 09/18/03.
2	Letter dated 09/07/03.
3	Letter to Scarab Board, dated 09/03/03.
4	Letter from Ray Macdonald re: Notice of Intention to Take Legal Action.

APPENDIX C

II. WITNESSES

None.

III. PANEL PROCEEDINGS

Prior to the start of the April 26, 2010 hearing, respondent filed a second motion to disqualify Panel Member C. David Miller, II. Respondent stated that, under MCR 9.115(F)(2)(a), Member Miller was required to notify the parties of a conflict of interest. Specifically, he should have notified the parties that his law firm, Garan, Lucow, Miller, displays three paintings in the outer chambers of its offices which were painted by a member of the Scarab Club. Respondent asserts that, since the allegations in Count Two of the formal complaint arose from respondent's lawsuit against individual members of the Scarab Club, the "possibility of personal or financial influence being exerted one way or the other" required disclosure by Member Miller under MCR 9.115(F)(2)(a).

As the sanction hearing began, respondent requested that his motion be heard, to which Chairperson Talarico replied:

> We were just served with a motion which is, I believe, is the motion to disqualify C. David Miller, this is the second or third motion that you've made to have Mr. Miller disqualified. It is, in my opinion, not timely.
>
> We're in the sanction phase of your discipline, and we are going to proceed this morning.
> [Tr 04/26/10, p 132.]

Mr. McGlinn, counsel for the Grievance Administrator, offered three exhibits which were marked as Petitioner's Exhibits A-C. Petitioner's Exhibit A is a copy of an admonishment, dated July 29, 1988. Petitioner's Exhibits B and C were copies of two reprimands, effective December 30, 1997, and April 8, 2003, respectively. Respondent objected to the admission of these exhibits as hearsay. The panel overruled respondent's objections and the exhibits were admitted.

Mr. McGlinn noted that, pursuant to the Michigan Supreme Court's order in *Grievance Administrator v Lopatin*, 462 Mich 235 (2000), hearing panels are directed to apply the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions when determining the level of discipline to be imposed after misconduct has been found. Based on the panel's findings, Mr. McGlinn argued that respondent's conduct falls under ABA Standard 6.2 - Abuse of the Legal Process.

At this point in the proceedings, after respondent had interrupted Mr. McGlinn's presentation several times, the following exchange took place:

CHAIRPERSON TALARICO:	I'm going to say it one more time, and that's it. You will have an opportunity to make all of your arguments once Mr. McGlinn is done.
MR. MACDONALD:	But I can't make the, I can't make them then.
CHAIRPERSON TALARICO:	You need to do that. You need to --
MR. MACDONALD:	Well, I can't write it all down. How could I possibly?

CHAIRPERSON TALARICO:	Okay. He's going slow, you keep interrupting him. You need to allow him to finish, and then you will have an opportunity to answer all those points.
MR. MACDONALD:	Yeah, I can't because I can't remember and I can't write them down that fast, so you're imposing an impossible standard on me if he's just rambling on and I'm supposed to address it all, where are my - - how am I going to have notes on everything said?
MR. BURGESS:	Mr. Macdonald, it's the same standard that we deal with as lawyers every day in court, every day in court. One side gets to speak, the other side has to wait till [sic] that side is done, then that side gets to rebut it or to put his side in. We do it every day as lawyers.
MR. MACDONALD:	Sometimes. Sometimes.
MR. BURGESS:	Yeah, sometimes we do, but it shouldn't be very difficult for you to highlight these points so that you can raise them when he's finished.
MR. MACDONALD:	Well, I think it's very difficult and I think as he goes from point to point I should be able to make an objection and point out what he's doing. He's blurring the line between civil and criminal cases, entirely different, we should be able to make that point as he's moving.
MR. MCGLINN:	I have not mentioned criminal cases.
CHAIRPERSON TALARICO:	Right, I know, Mr. McGlinn, don't bother. You need to really make as good notes as you can, we will - - we are also making notes. If there are points that you need assistance as you're making your argument, we will help you. But you cannot interrupt him anymore. That's it. There will not be any more interruptions.

[Tr 04/26/10, pp 153-154.]

To determine whether respondent's conduct warrants disbarment, under Standard 6.21, or suspension, under Standard 6.22, Mr. McGlinn noted that disbarment requires that the misconduct was committed knowingly and with the intent to benefit the lawyer, whereas a suspension only requires that the misconduct was committed knowingly but without intent to benefit the lawyer. Based on the panel's findings, Mr. McGlinn believed that a suspension under ABA Standard 6.22 was the appropriate sanction.

Next, Mr. McGlinn identified the following aggravating factors under ABA Standard 9.22: 9.22(a) - prior disciplinary offenses; 9.22(b) - dishonest or selfish motive; 9.22(c) - pattern of misconduct; 9.22(d) - multiple offenses; 9.22(e) - bad faith obstruction of a disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules of or the orders of a disciplinary agency; 9.22(g) - refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; 9.22(h) - vulnerability of victim; 9.22(i) - substantial experience in the practice of law; and 9.22(j) - indifference to making restitution. Of the aggravating factors, Mr. McGlinn stated that he believed that Standards 9.22(b); (c) and (e) were the most serious and should be afforded the most weight by the panel.

Based on ABA Standard 6.22 and the aggravating factors identified under ABA Standard 9.22, Mr. McGlinn stated that the Grievance Administrator was requesting that respondent's license

to practice law in Michigan be suspended for one year, and that he be required to take and pass the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam as a condition precedent to filing a petition for reinstatement.

After a brief recess, the panel proceeded to hear respondent's argument regarding sanctions. However, respondent began his argument by stating that the hearing panel was not in compliance with MCR 9.115(J)(1):

> We have a report on misconduct which I would assume should fit into (J), but there's no certified transcript, there's no summary of the evidence, exhibits in brief are not included, and there is very little in finding of fact. So we're on the short end of compliance with (J). Report on misconduct itself is in error, there's numerous errors in this report.
>
> Number one, I should state that I don't feel that I'm guilty of any misconduct at all. Zero. As to the Count 1, all the decisions there were run past the client or originated with the client, received his complete consent.
> (Tr 04/26/10, p 166.)

Counsel for the Grievance Administrator objected, stating that respondent was now testifying. After a discussion off the record, Member Burgess stated:

> Mr. Macdonald, you do this every time, it seems, you address everything except for what you should be addressing. And we've asked you to address the mitigating factors that exist here, if any, and you really need to do that. You're addressing substantive issues, you're attacking the decision, attacking the way things are set up and whether or not they were done properly. Those are matters which you can ultimately appeal, but here you really need to address the mitigating factors, which - - you've got a list there, you can go through that list and pick out which ones you think apply, but this is the time to do this, not to do the kinds of things that you've started doing when you started to speak here. So I would suggest that you that you [sic] really get to that, to those issues, because those are the things that are going to affect our decision here.
> [Tr 04/26/10, pp 166-167.]

Respondent continued to argue with the panel before Member Miller took the opportunity to explain the purpose of the sanction hearing to respondent:

MR. MILLER:	So we're to, like, the damage phase. So tell us why we shouldn't institute the suspension that Mr. McGlinn has suggested of a year. Tell us why we shouldn't do that, okay?
MR. MACDONALD:	Uh-huh. You see, we can't go into aggravation or mitigation on the assumption that I am guilty of whatever you found because whatever you found is not reasonable, you see, so I'm going to [sic] into that again with respect to aggravation and mitigation.
MR. MILLER:	No, that doesn't go into aggravation and mitigation except for it makes it more aggravating that you are going back to something that's already been decided that's - - that's aggravation.

* * *

MR. MACDONALD: That's not the case. You can make a motion for a new trial, you can make a motion to correct the record, you can make all these motions to - -

* * *

MR. BURGESS: Not here, not now. You really are not going to - - whether you agree with this finding, and I assume you don't agree with it and you're going to appeal it, that's fine, but you're going to have to accept that it is the finding of this panel.

MR. MACDONALD: Uh-huh.

MR. BURGESS: And you're now going to have to deal with mitigating factors. You're going to have to deal with it, you cannot deal with the findings themselves. That's already over, it's finished, you're just going to have to accept it for purposes of this hearing right today, and you're going to have to provide mitigating factors because we have to make a decision, sir, what to do with you right now, whether to agree with Mr. McGlinn or to not agree with Mr. McGlinn. So please tell us why we shouldn't agree with him or why - - why that he's wrong about this in terms of what discipline we should apply here, if any. Okay? Tell us, please. We're trying to help you, Mr. Macdonald.

[Tr 04/26/10, pp 175-177.]

Respondent stated that the following mitigating factors should be considered under ABA Standard 9.32: 9.32(b) - absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 9.32(e) - full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 9.32(g) - character or reputation; 9.32(j) - delay in disciplinary proceedings; and 9.32(m) - remoteness of prior offenses. With respect to his character or reputation, respondent offered four letters which were marked and admitted as Respondent's Exhibits 1-4 without objection.

Respondent further argued that he should receive a reprimand and that, at the most, he should receive a 30 day suspension.

IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SANCTIONS

This panel, in its report on misconduct issued April 7, 2010, found that respondent had committed professional misconduct by filing frivolous pleadings to delay proceedings in the district court; frivolously asserted or controverted an issue with the proceeding; knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; engaged in conduct that is a violation of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct; engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; engaged in conduct that exposes the legal profession or the courts to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach; and engaged in conduct that is contrary to justice, ethics, honesty, or good morals. Specifically, we found that respondent's conduct was in violation of Michigan Court Rules (MCR) 9.104(A)(1)-(4); and Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 3.1; 3.4(c); and 8.4(a) and (c).

In determining the appropriate sanction for a finding of misconduct, the Michigan Supreme Court has directed that hearing panels in Michigan utilize the American Bar Association's Standards

for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. *Grievance Administrator v Lopatin*, 462 Mich 235, 238 (2000). The following factors under ABA Standard 3.0 should be considered:

(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

In the instant matter, respondent was found to have violated MRPC 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous."), and MRPC 3.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal . . . . ").

With respect to respondent's mental state, we note that respondent's conduct was clearly done knowingly. In one matter, he repeatedly filed motions to disqualify judges in the district court. Those motions were denied because there was no evidence of bias. In a second matter, two separate courts - the Wayne County Circuit Court and the Michigan Supreme Court - imposed sanctions on respondent. In the Wayne County Circuit Court matter, Chief Judge Mary Beth Kelly imposed a sanction for $1,075.00 against respondent for "blatant abuse of the litigation process and for filings that were not justified in fact or law." (Petitioner's Exhibit 10.) In the same case, the Michigan Supreme Court assessed $250 in costs "against plaintiff MacDonald in favor of defendants under MCR 8.316(D)(1) for filing a vexatious appeal." (Petitioner's Exhibit 11.)

As for the potential or actual injury caused by respondent's conduct, we specifically note the finding by Judge Redmond regarding respondent's numerous motions to disqualify judges in the 41A District Court, which were the subject of the misconduct allegations in Count One of the formal complaint:

> The true tragedy throughout these proceedings concerns the Defendant . . . The undeniable fact is that the Defendant could have had a jury trial ***over one year*** ago. If the Defendant was found not guilty, he could have had his name cleared and moved on with his life. If he was found guilty, perhaps he could have been ordered to obtain and benefit from, among other things, alcohol-related treatment. **One year**. In either instance, the consequences to the Defendant and community are significant and it is this Court's hope that all parties will not lose sight of the true focus of this case. It is not the judge.
> [Petitioner's Exhibit 1 - *State of Michigan v Ronald Boguszewski*, Case No. 04-1629P, 10/05/05 Opinion and Order.]

Once we have considered the factors under ABA Standard 3.0, the next step is to determine the appropriate sanction standard based on the duty violated. Based on the misconduct found in this case, we agree with the Grievance Administrator's counsel that ABA Standard 6.2 applies. As noted by Mr. McGlinn, the difference between a revocation and a suspension hinges on the fact that for disbarment, the misconduct must have been done knowingly and with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, while a suspension only requires that the misconduct had been committed knowingly. We adopt the Grievance Administrator's argument that the misconduct in this matter was done knowingly but without intent to benefit the lawyer or another. Therefore, the panel finds that a suspension is warranted under ABA Standard 6.22.

In addition to ABA Standard 6.22, we find that ABA Standard 7.0 - Violations of Duties Owed to the Profession - also applies, specifically Standard 7.2, which states:

> Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

In Michigan, the minimum suspension period is "not less than 30 days." (MCR 9.106(2).) Therefore, we begin with the consideration of a minimum suspension of 30 days, which was the maximum sanction requested by respondent. In determining whether to increase or decrease the level of discipline, ABA Standard 3.0 allows for the consideration of any existing aggravating or mitigating factors.

As noted above, counsel for the Grievance Administrator identified a number of aggravating factors under ABA Standard 9.22. We find that Standard 9.22(e) - bad faith obstruction of a disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules of or the orders of a disciplinary agency - carried the most weight. Despite being sanctioned in two separate courts for "abuse of the litigation process" and "filing a vexatious appeal," respondent continues this behavior in the instant case. In less than one year since the formal complaint was filed, respondent has filed over 10 different motions before this panel, a majority of which seek to disqualify various members of the hearing panel, the hearing panel itself, and the AGC's counsel. These motions are equivalent to the numerous motions respondent filed to disqualify judges in *State of Michigan v Ronald Boguszewski*, Case No. 04-1629P, the matter which gave rise to the allegations in Count One.

Respondent's actions in the instant case also mimic his behavior which was the subject of the allegations in Count Two. There, respondent was ultimately sanctioned by the Wayne County Circuit Court and the Michigan Supreme Court for his abuse of the litigation process. Here, the remainder of the motions filed by respondent are either a) premature (motion for directed verdict filed before the panel filed its report on misconduct); or, b) improper (motion for new trial). The Michigan Court Rules regarding the Attorney Discipline System are found under MCR 9.100 and they include the procedure by which a party can appeal a panel's findings and/or decision. However, instead of conforming with the applicable court rules, respondent's motion for directed verdict was premature, and his motion for a new trial was improper.

As for the mitigating factors identified by respondent under ABA Standard 9.32, these factors do not outweigh the existing aggravating factors. It is because of the number and nature of the aggravating factors present in this case that the panel believes that the discipline should be greater than the one year suspension requested by the Grievance Administrator.

Accordingly, this panel will order that respondent's license to practice law in the State of Michigan be suspended for two years and that he pay the costs associated with this matter. Additionally, in order for respondent to be eligible to file a petition for reinstatement in accordance with MCR 9.123(B) and MCR 9.124, the panel will order that he comply with the following conditions:

A. Respondent shall take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). Respondent shall provide written proof of his successful completion of this exam to the Attorney Grievance Commission and the Attorney Discipline Board within 14 days of passing the exam.

B. Respondent shall attend 15 hours of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) in pre-trial procedure. Half of the CLE hours shall be in civil pre-trial procedure and the other half of the CLE hours shall be in criminal pre-trial procedure. Respondent shall provide written proof of successful completion of these courses to the Attorney Grievance Commission and the Attorney Discipline Board within 14 days of attending each course.

V. SUMMARY OF PRIOR MISCONDUCT

AGC File No.	Discipline	Effective Date
1687/87	Admonishment	07/29/88
ADB Case No.	**Discipline**	**Effective Date**
90-83-GA	Reprimand	12/30/97
00-190-GA	Reprimand and Restitution (By Consent)	04/08/03

VI. ITEMIZATION OF COSTS

Attorney Grievance Commission:	
(Itemized Statement filed 06/14/10)	$ 168.20
Attorney Discipline Board:	
Hearing held on 06/30/09	$ 155.00
Hearing held 10/19/09	$ 356.50
Hearing held 01/26/10	$ 104.00
Hearing held 02/23/10	$ 526.50
Hearing held 04/26/10	$ 295.00
Administrative Fee [MCR 9.128(B)(1)]	$ 1,500.00
TOTAL:	**$ 3,105.20**

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE BOARD
Tri-County Hearing Panel #22

By: (P-23748, Exec. Dir. ADB) for
Paula M. Talarico, Chairperson
(With permission 6/21/2010

DATED: June 21, 2010